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Developing countries frequently maintain an overvalued nominal exchanges rate, rewlting
in real exchange rate misalignment. To finance import demand at the overvalued exchange rate,
countries have to raise the level of income taxation or they have to resort to monatary fiasnce.
This paper explains nominal and implicitly real exchange rato misalignment as the outoome of the
political ptncess. More specifically, the paper explains the misalignment of an import exchange
rate relative to a market ezchange rate used for exports. Voters differ in their ownership of a
single factor of production. Real exchange rate overvaluation resulta if the mediaa vota ~per~ds a
relatively larger share of his income on the importable good. For a giveo inoome distribution, tiw
rate of overvaluation in politica! equilibrium declines with the overall levd of inoorne. Lt the case
of monetary finance, the real exchange rate may be appreciating over the political cycle.
~ 1 thank Harald Uhlig and seminar participants at the Universiry of Chicago i3usinass School
for helpful comments.1
1. Introductfon
Real exchange rates in developing countries appeaz to be quite volatile. To some eztent, real
ezchange rate adjustments no doubt reflect changes in underlying exehange rate fundamentals.
Real exchange rate movements, however, appear to be too sizeable and too often reversed to be
mere reflections of underlying fundamentals. Instead, ezchange rate policy per se appeara to be an
important destabilizing influence. Given the importance of the real exchange rate, the welfare
costs of the policy-induced variability of the real exchange rate may be considerable for some
countries.
This paper examines the political economy of exchange rate policy. Ezchange rate adjust-
ments, in particular, are assumed to be determined by popular vote. Voters differ in their
ownership shares of the economy's single factor of production called land. In this setting,
exchange rate policy cannot affect relative incomes. In this respect, the present paper differs from
contributions on the political ewnomy of tariff policy by, for instance, Brock and Magee (1978)
and Mayer (1984). Exchange rate policy still affects agents differently to the extent that they have
different expenditure shares on tradeables and nontradebles. Exchange rate adjustments that imply
a lower relative price of tradeables, in particular, benefit agents that spend a relatively large share
of their income on nontradeables. Survey data gathered by Hazell and Rcell (1983) suggests that
an agent's expenditure share on tradeables falls with his income. This suggests that an ezchaztge
rate policy that reduces the relative price of tradeables benefits the poor relative to the rich. The
relative price of tradeahles is reduced if the exchange rate is overvalued. This paper showa ffiat a
median voter that is relatively poor will be in favor of such an overvalued exchange rate. The rate
of overvaluation preferred by a poor median voter is shown to decline with the general level of
income for a given relative distribution of income. This result can explain why real exchange rate
misalignment appears to be a relatively serious problem in developing economies.
Agents are assumed to consume importables and nontradeables. A lower relative price of
importables facing consumers, if desired by the median voter, can be brought about in a variety of2
ways. One way is to institute a separate, relatively appreciated exchange rate for import putjwses.
Alternatively, the relative price of importables can be recluced by a straightforward import
subsidy. In either case, the government needs to raise revenues to cover the budgetary expense of
cheapening imports. In this paper, we assume that the government can institute a flat taz on all
factor income or alternatively apply monetary finance. In practice, many countries use exchange
rate policy to affect relative prices in combination with monetary finance to balance the budget. In
this instance, an expansion ot' the money supply against a backdrop of a constant nominal import
exchange rate leads to a further real appreciation of the exchange rate. An ongoing real exchange
rate appreciation, in turn, increases the need for monetary finance. 7ite process of exchange rate
overvaluation and money printing continues until the nominal import exchange rate is adjusted by
the political process. The adjustment takes the form of a devaluation of the nominal import
exchange rate. lf the government has limited taxing powers, however, then the devaluation
preferred by the median voter may be insufficient to prevent a renewed overvaluation-cum-money
printing cycle. The model thus can explain recurrent periods of real exchange rate misaligtunent.
The present paper extends the two-good model in Huizinga (forthcoming) on price ceilings for
necessities to a three-good model of exchange rate management in an open economy. 1be present
paper, in addition, starts from more general preferences and government finance options. Several
previous contributions have examined reasons for policy makers to bring about deviations of real
exchange rates from apparent equilibrium values. Rodrik (1988), for instance, argues that policy-
induced real exchange rate devaluations that strengthen the demand for tradeables at present
improve welfare. if the prcxluction of tradeables is charecterized by Iearning-by-doing. Van der
Ploeg (1989) further examines political exchange rate cycles, where the government effects an
appreciation of the real exchange rate prior to elections to facilitate reelection. 7ite slow response
of the trade balance to real exchange rate movements, embodied in the J-curve, implies that an
exchange rate appreciation leads to an improved short-run inflation performance without an
immediate worsening of the trade balance. 'flte political effectiveness of exchange rate cycles of3
this type, however, rests of the assumption that voters are myopic. The real exohange rate cycles
examined in this paper, instead, are rnnsistent with full voter rationality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic model.
Section 3 examines voting on exchange rate adjustments and their implications for the rea!
exchange rate over the political cycle. Section 4 examines the broader applicability of the modcl to
the case of two sepazate import gcnids: an import good that is imponed at a single official
exchange rate, and an import gocxl that is imported at the (black) mazket exchange rate. In this
inatance, the model has immediate implications for the premium of the (black) mazket exchange
rate over the official exchange rate. The section also considers how exchange rate management
can be used in combination with various non-exchange rate policy instruments to bring about the
relative goods prices desired by the political process. Section 5 concludes.
2. 7he mode!
Let there be a single factor of production, L, which we will call land. The economy is
populated by a range of agents indexed by i, with i e[0,1], that aze infinitely lived. The agents
only differ in their individual land ownership shares. Let agent i's land ownership share be
dertoted a(i) so that this agent's absolute land ownership is given by ~(i)L. Agents are ordered by
I
their land ownership share so that )`(i) increases with the index i. Cleazly, we have ~~~t)d! .~,
There are three goods: a nontradeable, N, an importable, Y, and an exportable, X, all of
which are perishahle. The ecunomy only pniduces the nontradeable and exportable goods.
Technology is assumecf to be linear. Units are chosen, in particular, such that a unit of either the
nontradeable, N, or the exportahle, X, can be produced with a single unit of land. The economy is
assumed to be small in international markets. As a result, the country faces a constant world price
ofthe importable, Y, in terms uf the exportable, X, denoted ~.
Agents consume only the nontradeable good, N, and the importable good, Y.t The lifetime
utility of agent i from time t onwards, denoted Ucf). can be expressed as follows,4
~
(1r(n- jla log (N,~) - A) t(1 - a)(YJfi) - P)je~rds 0~ a G 1, á e 0 (I)
r
where N~(fJ and YJf) are individua! i's consumption of the nontradeable and the importable goods
at time s, respectively. In (1), la and P aze constants representing the minimum consumption levels
of the two goods, while b is the suhjective discount rate.
Let P~, Pyr and Px~ be the three goods prices in terms of the economy's money at time t.
Money, denoted M, is the only tinancial asset available to the economy's residents. Agent i's
money holdings, Mtt), increase with his land rental income equal to ],(1)LRr, where Rr is the land
rental rate at time t. At the same time, money holdings decline with the agent's consumption
expenditure P~11V~~) f P~,,Y~r) at time t. Formally, the change in agent i's money holdings,
dM~~), at time t is given by,
dM, (i) ~~f) ~ R~ -~P,,, Nff) ~ PY, Y,~)I (2)
Money is necessary to conduct transactions. Reflecting the primary role of money in financing
consumption expenditures, we witl assume that agent i's demand for money, M~(t), at time t is
subject to the following cash-in-advance constraint,
M,0) Z P„~ N~f) t P,,, Y,f1) (3)
In what follows, we will assume that the subjective discount rate, ó, is so large that the cash-
in-advance constraint in (3) is always binding. In the language of Feenstra (1985), this means that
all agents are illiyuid at all times. As a result, the agents' land rental incomes, money holdings
and total consumption expenditures ere all proportional to the land ownership share, ~(i).
The logarithmic utility specification in (1) along with the money demand relationship in (3)5
implies that the consumption levels N(iJ and Y(i) of the two goods for individual i are as follóws,
N~~ ~~ ~Mfi) - Cl . A
P" J




where C ~ p~ 1Q t py Q and where time subscripts are deleted.
In deriving (4) and (5), we assume that all individuals can afford to purchase the minimum
consumption basket consisting of quantities ~~d Q of the nontradeable and impottable goods, or
equivalently that M(f1 2 C for all i. Aggregate consumption levels of the nontradeable and
importable goods are found by aggregating the invididual consumption levels in (4) and (~ for all
individuals. The resulting expressiuns are as in (4) and (S), without the agent index i. The
variables N and Y then stand tor aggregate consumption levels of the nontradeable and the
importable goods, while M stands for aggregate money holdings.
Below, we will consider policy interventions that affect the price of good Y, Pr, facing consu-
mers. More specifically, we consider policy interventions that leave all relative prices tat
involving the importahle gcxid unchanged. In this instance, the simple production technology
immediately implies that we have P,~ - Ps - R throughout. L,et us define the internal (external)
real exchange rate as the price of the importahle good in terms of the twntradeable (exportable)
good, i.e, as P~,IPa ( P~,IPz ). As we have Pn - P;, the two real exchange ratea will always be
equal. Let us use B to denote either real exchange rate. The real exchange rate variable, B, clearly
equals the world price of the impurtable in terms of the exportable, B , in the absence of any
policy interventiun.
The real exchange rate, 9, can he affected by eamomic policy in several ways. 71te authorides
can, for instance, implement a system of multiple exchange rates with separate exchange rates for6
imports and exports. If the foreign currency price of the importable good, Y, is unity, then the
domestic currency price of the importable, Py, equals the nominal import exchange rate by the
law of one price. We can thus refer to Py as the nominal import exchange rate. If Py is set below
p~, then the real exchange rate B is reduced below ~, and vice versa. Many countries, indeed,
maintain separate exchange rates for import and export transactions. In 1992, 33 countries in
particular operated import exchange rates different from ezport exchange rates.2 At the same
time, 32 (31) countries maintained more than one exchange rate for imports (exports). As an
alternative to multiple cummercial exchange rates, the authorities can affect the real exchange rate,
9, by any combination of consumption or trade taxes, as is discussed further in section 4. For the
remainder of this section, we assume that the primary policy instrument is the nominal import
exchange rate, Py.
With B less than ~, the exchange authorities are incurcing a budgetary loss on their foreign
exchange operations equal to ~~ -g~y in terms of the nontradeable good, N. Let government
spending other than on foreign exchange operations in terms of the nontradeble good be equal to
G. Government revenues consist of tax revenues from taxing all rental income at a rate r. In
addition, the government may print muney in order to balance the budget. The required monetary
finance in terms of the nontradeable good is given by,
~ rTL s(~ -BJYtG
pn
(6)
The economy also has to maintain external balance. 7iiis implies that the economy is subject
to the following re,eource constraint,
L- N. B Y. G C1)
After substituting for N and Y using (4) and (5) into (7), we can obtain the followingexpression for the real exchange rate B,
L~-(1 -a)~ M - ~
A - Py B
(8)
a M A - PI
Py B J
whereL~~L -1a -~P-G. ,
Expression (8) implies that a devaluetion of the nominal import ezchange rate, Py, also leads
to a real exchange rate devaluation for a given money supply M, as totally differentiating (8)
yields dBldPy G 0. At the same time, money creation leads to a real exchange rate appreciation
for a given nominal exchange rate Py, as dBIdM ~ 0. Equations (t5) and (8) and the ezpressioo
for aggregate importable demand, Y, together imply the following ezpression for real tnoney
creation in terms of the nontradeable,
~ - G - TL . (f - a)(~ - B)
L~ . (B - B)p
Pn a B ~ (1 - a)~
(9)
Ezpression (9) confirms that an appreciation of the real exchange rate leads to a lazger rate of
real money creation, for given values of G and r. Note that a higher government spending, G, or
a lower tax rate, r, also lead to a larger real rnoney creation. At the same time, real tnoney
creation decreases with ~1, and it increases with y for a given value of 6 less than B.3 If in fact
dM ~ 0, then (8) implies that the real exchange rate, B, falls over time, while equation (9) in turn
implies that the rate of real money creation, dMIP„, rises over time. As B falls, the rate of money
creation in terms of the imlx~rtahle g~xxl, dMIPy, equally increases. Note that ongoing money
creation against a background of a fixed nominal import exchange rate stimulates the cotuumptàn
of the importable gixid, Y. Tu tinance these additional imports, exports have to rise. Tbis is
accomplished by a shift in production from the nontradeable to the exportable sectors.0
3. Voting on exehonge rate policy
In this section, we cunsider the prucess of exchange rate adjustment by popular vote. In
principle, the electorate can vote periudically on nominal exchange rate adjustments, giving ríse to
intervals of fixed nominal exchange rates between votes. Alternatively, voters can establish a
prospective path of the nominal exchange rate until the next vote. In this instance, the electorate,
in essence, establishes a tablita of preannounced nominal exchange rates for the entire political
cycle. The tablita can be chosen so that the real exchange rate in fact is oonstant over the political
cycle.4 Before we can consider voting on exchange rate policy, we first have to consider how
exchange rate policy affects individuaf welfare. We have to eonsider, in particular, how the
impact of exchange rate policy un individual welfare depends on the individual's rarilcing in the
overall income distribution.
To this end, let agent i's instantaneous welfare at time t be denoted V(B, l). Using (1), (4), (5)
and (8), we can express V(B, i) as follows,
V(B, !) - log ~a~`(! - a)1-a) . a log B . log (M(i~ - C)
Y
(10)
Expression (10) indicates that an appreciation of the real exchange rate, i.e. a lowering of B,
other things equal reduces instantaneous utility, as it entails a higher nontradeable price, P~. An
individual's welfare clearly increases with his own money holdings, M(i). To see how exchange
rate pulicy affects individuel welfare, we can ditierentiate V(9, i) with respect to PY to yield,




M ~ d(IIB) p
(Pv)z dPY
L~ - (I - a)~
M(f) { d(IIB) A
(P )z dPY
- Y (11)
M -C M(1) -C
PY PY9
Equation (ll) implies that the qualitative impact of changes in Py on individual welfaze
depends on the size uf individual muney holdings, M(i), relative to aggregate money holdings, M.
To sce this, let us first wnsider huw exchange rate policy affects the mean voter, i.e. the voter i
for whom M(1) - M. First note that if g.~, then expression (g) implies thatp~ . MI(1 - G)
~ Py - M~I(L - G)- The expression for Py and (11) together now imply that dV(B, t)IdPy -
0 if g . B with MQ) - M. The mean vuter thus cannot benefit fmm an exchange rate policy that
causes g to diverge from ~. The mean voter, in other words, cannot benefit from exchange rate
misalignment. Next, let us cunsider a vater i, who is poorer than the mean voter, i.e. for whom
M(i) c M. Again starting from g.~, we see that such a relatively poor voter benefits from an a
reduction in Py, which implies a real exchange rate appreciation, if
AP ) 1 - a
p a
(12)
For a proof, see the appendix. In conditiun (12), the marginal expenditure share on the
importable good relative to the nontradeable good, i.e. (1 - a)Ia, is less than the spending on
minimum quantity of importables, p, relative to the minimum quantity of nontradeables, ~Q. As
also shown in the appendix, cunditiun (12) is equivalent to QIy ) 1P1Ar. Finally, it can be shown
that if (12) holds, then a reduction in PY reduces the price of the minimum consumption bundle of
the importable and nontradeable goods, i.e. QdPy t 1~dP„ G 0 if dPy c 0. These results are
summarized as follows,
Proposlrion l: A voter puorer than the mean voter benefits from a reduction in the nominal import
exchange rate, Py, if spending on the impurtable in the minimum consumption bundle is relatively
large so that QIy ~~IIV. If su, a rtduction in Py results in a reduction in the price of the
minimum consumptiun hundle ot'the impurtable and nontradeable goods.lo
In developing countries, importables often include basic necessities such as staple foods,
while nontradeables may include many services that relatively speaking are luxuries. Ezportables
are usually concentrated in one or a few sectors that differ from country to country. As a result, it
is difficult to say in general whether exportables form an important component of tl)e basic
consumption bundle. Evidence on the budget shares spent on nontradeables, importables and
exportables for Malaysian households in 1972 is provided by Hazel and Roell (1983).S Poorer
households indeed are shown to spend relatively little on nontradeables. 7ite margina( ezpenditure
share on nontradeables of househulds in the first income decile, specifically, is estimated to be
roughly 24 per cent, and it is 55 per cent for households in the tenth íncome decile.ó 71te
marginal spending shares on imports for the two income groups, in contrast, are both around 38
per cent. Within the imports category, marginal expenditure shifts from food to non-food items
for wealthier households. Marginal expenditure shares on exportables for household in the first
and tenth decile are estimated to be 38 and 7 per cent, respectively.
Overall, the evidence suggests that poorer households spend relatively little on nontradeables.
ln our model, we will capture this by assuming that ~Q ~ 0 and p 7 0. Proposition 1 now
implies that agents poorer than the mean benefit from an overvaluation of the real ezchange rate.
Let us consider that voters choose a(constant) real exchange rate equal to or below the equilibri-
um real exchange rate, ~.~ Voters can institute a constant real exchange rate, if they choose a
oonstant nominal import exchange rate, PY, and at the same can freely choose the income tax rate,
r, consistent with a constant money supply, M, in (6). It can be shown that voter preferences over
the possible values of the real exchange rate are single-peaked.s The outcome of the vote,
therefore, is the real exchange rate preferred by the median voter. According to Proposition 1,
only voters poorer than the mean can benefit from a real exchange rate appreciation. 'I1te outoome
of the vote, thus, will be an overvalued real exchange rate, if and only if the median voter is
poorer than the mean voter. Fur this case, the equilihrium real exchange rate is negatively related
to the income of the median voter reletive to the mean voter9'Iltese result are sutttmarized asIt
follows,
Proposltion 2: The constant real exchange rate determined by popular vote is overvalued, if the
median voter ís poorer than the mean voter. For this case, the exchange rate is negatively related
to the income of the median voter relative to mean income.
It is interesting to examine how the outcome of the vote is affected by changes in the utility
specification in (1) for a given income distribution. First, we will examine a change in the
minimum consumption of the importahle, Q. Not surprisingly, a relatively poor median voter
wishes a further real exchange rate appreciation following a larger value of Q, as is shown in the
appendix. At the same time, the individual goods prices Py and P~ consistent with the more
appreciated real exchange rate are hoth higher. As the relative price of imports is cheapened, the
nominal prices of both gaids thus have to increase to ensure that the economy maintains its
external balance. This implies that the nominal import exchange rate, Py, has to be devalued, even
if the real exchange rate appreciate,c. Next, let us wnsider an increase in the marginal expenditure
on the importable good, i.e. a reduction in a. A lower value of a again leads the median voter to
desire a further appreciation of the real exchange rate, ~. Again, the real appreciazion has to be
accompanieá by higher nominal gixxls prices Pn and Py. Thus the shift in marginal expenditure
towards importahles again is accompanied hy a devaluation of the nominal import exchange rate.
These results are summarized es follows,
Proposition 3:
An increase in the minimum consumption of the importable, Q, or in the marginal expenditure
share on importables, i.e. a reduction in a, both lead a median voter who is poorer than the mean
voter to desire a further appreciation of the real exchange rate. In both instances, the importable
and nontradeahle gocxis price rise, which implies that the nominal import exchange rate isIz
devalued.
Next, let us consider how nominal and real goods prices in the economy are affected by
economic growth, as indicated by an increase in the aggregate factor endownment, L. We will
assume that relative incomes are unchanged so that in fact all agents' incomes increase proportio-
nately. As shown in the appendix, an increase in aggregate factor resources, L, leads to a
raduction in both goods prices Pn and PY. Interestingly, the economic expansion leads to a
devaluation of the real exchange rate, B, which reflects that the expansion leads the median voter
to prefer a smaller degree of real exchange rate overvaluation. The rationale is that average
expenditures shares on nuntradeahles end importables hecome more alike, as society grows
wealthier. As a result, the meJian voter has less to gain from relative price distortions implicit in
exchange rate overvaluation. The role of exchange rate policy as a redistrihutive device indeed
appears to be more important in developing countries than in the developed countriea. As a result,
persistent exchange rate disequilhrium appears to be a relatively common phenomenon in
developing countries. These results are summarized as follows,
Proposirion 4: Vuters poorer than the median voter prefer a smaller overvaluation of the real
exchange rate, as the overall level of income increases for a given relative distribution of income.
The prulxnitiun alsu applie.e tu increa.ee,c in natiunal resources as a result of international
borrowings or other capital intlows. A developing country that, for instance, receives a grant that
is subseyuently distrihuted amung the pupulatiun in proportion to individual land holdings will
depreciate the real ex~hangr rate in reslwnse to the enlarged national resources. 71te reductán of
the incentive for the median vuter to select disquilibrium exchange rates following international
resource transfers can be seen as a henetit of such transfers.
So far, we have assumed that voters can select a value of the real exchange rate that is13
constant over time. As indicat~xl, this applies if votus can chcxise a cunstant nominal impurt
exchange rate, Py, and the incume tax rate, r, freely. !f the taxing powers of the government,
however, are limited, then a constant real exchange rate, equal to the median voter's preferred
real exchange rate, may not be possible. To see this, consider that we have r- 0 and C- 0,
while the numinal exchange rate, P~., is adjusted at regular intervals by the electorate. If voters
initially select Py such that g ~~, then onguing monetary finance leads to a gradual appreciation
of the real exchange rate until the next adjustment of the nominal exchange rate, Py. In essence,
voters now have to decide between a stable real exchange rate, equal to ~, or a pató of a
continuously appreciating real exchange rate over the pulitical cycle. A median voter richer than
the mean voter, as before, cannut henetit from real exchange rate overvaluation and thus will
prefer a constant real exchange rate eyual to B. A median voter poorer than the mean voter,
óowever, can in principle benefit from a path of an increasingly overvalued real exchange rate.
At the beginning of the political cycle, voters determine the nomirtal exchange rate to be
maintained throughuut the cycle. This nominal exchange rate implies a real exchange rate, denoted
Bb, at the beginning of the political cycle. The dynamics of monetary finance and price adjustment
and the length of the pulitical cycle then tugether determine the real exchange rate at the end of
the political cycle, denutecl B~. Let the median voter be puorer than the mean voter. The voting
outcome will now be such that the (constant) real exchange rate, B', preferred by the median voter
lies in between the beginning and ending real exchange rates, By and Be, as fullows,
e,~e' ~eb~B (14)
The voting outcome is as in (14), as any alternative characterised by either 8b 5 B' or by B`
2 8~ will he valued less than a range of paths oharacterised by (14) by at least half of the
electorate. With Br ~ B~, tix instance, the medien vuter as well as all poorer agents will have
lower welfare than would he Ixissihle from a various paths characterizeJ by (14), even if the14
median voter and all poorer voters prefer such paths to a constant real exchange rate equal to ~.
Note that the real exchange rate cycle, as characterized by (14), will be recurrent, as the nominal
import exchange rate devaluation at the beginning of each political cycle will be too small to
preclude a renewed real exchange rate cycle.t~ These result are summarized as follows,
Proposition 5.~ In the ahsence of sufticiently high income taxes, periodic voting on the level of the
nominal import exchange rete can give rise to recurrent real exchange rate cycles, where the real
exchange rate appreciates over the political cycle.
Note from (8) and (9) that the rate of real money creation increases over the electoral cycle,
as the real exchange rate appreciates. At the same time, the consumption of importables rises over
the period, while the consumption of nontradeables declines. To maintain external balance, the
volume of exports has to increase. The instantaneous welfare of the median voter first rises over
the electoral cycle until the real exchange rate reaches ~, and then falls. The welfare of voters
richer (poorer) than the median voter peaks earlier (later) than the welfare of the median voter.
Note that the median voter prefers a constant real exchange rate equal to B~ to any real exchange
rate cycle. Cycles, therefure, will cease to exist if the monetary finance can be replaced by a
higher level of rental income taxatiun.
Evidence of the existence of real exchange rate cycles can be found in Edwards (1988), who
presents time series of the real exchange rates for 12 developing wuntries over the period 1964-
1985. For many of the,ee cuuntries, the grephs are characterized by periodic large real devaluati-
ons, effectcxl by nominal devaluations, followed by gradual real exchange rate appreciations. The
real exchange rates of Brazil, [srael, India, and the Phillipines,for instance, display such patterns.
Brazilian reel exchange rate cycles appear tu he relatively short at about three years. The length of
the Isreali cycle is closer to four years, while the Indian and Phillipine cycles appear to last about
a decade. In the second halt' of the 1980s, the pace of Brazilian real exchange rate-cum-inflationIS
cycles appears to have yuickened. Brazil, in particular, experienced four wnsecutive real
exchange rate-cum-inflation stahilizatiun plans betwcen January 1986 and April 1990. l~ver this
almost five year period, Brazilian intlation displayed a regular, saw-like pattern.t t
Edwards (1993, p. 35) further pruvidrs evidence un the political timing of exchange rate
adjustments. The evidence contirms that major devaluations by democratic regimes in developing
countries tend to take place relatively quickly after a transfer of power. For parliamentary
democracies, 70 per cent of the devaluations considered, in particular, occurred within 2 years
after the transfer of government, while only 20 percent of devaluations occurred 1 year or less
time before the next government trensfer. Devaluations may quickly follow the transfer of power,
as democratic regimes are perceived to be strongest in the early years of their administratioos.
Early devaluations also have the advantage that their causes can more easily be blamed on the
regimés predeLesstir.
4. Alternative interprrtations nfthe mode!
So far, we have assumed that the main policy instrument is a fixed nominal import exchange
rate. This nominal import exchange rate immediately determines the domestic currency price of
imports transacted at the import exchange rate. In this setting, monetary finance is shown to
increase the domestic currency prices of the nontradeable and exportable goods. Reflecdng a
higher domestic currency price of exportables, the nominal exchange rate applicable to exports
depreciates. The mixlel thus, in essunce, is une of multiple exchange rates, with a relatively
favored exchange rate tiir imtwrt purpus~.
The model, however, also applies to countries that have a single fixed nominal official
exchange rate, but limit the range uf transactions that can be conducted at this exchange rate. The
remainder of international transactiuns then are valued at the (black) market exchange rate. 71te
government may, for instan~e, maintain lists of sanetioned and of proscribed imports. In some
countries, the importation of various luxury items, for instance, is forbidden. In this aetting,16
prospective importers are ahle to ohtain foreign exchange at the official exchange rate only for
approved imports. The mixlel of this paper applies immediately to this situation, if nontradeable
consumption is replaced by the wnsumption of non-approved imports. As before, we can maintain
that there is no domestic production of importable goods. 7tie variable B now is the ratio of the
official import exchange rate to the (black) market exchange rate for non-approved imports. This
market exchange rate also applies to exports, unless there are strictly enforced export surrender
requirements that force exporters to surrender their export earnings at the more appreciated
official exchange rete.t'- In this guise, the mixlel predicts the path of the (black) market exchan-
ge rate premium over the political cycle. The model, specifically, indicates that the black market
premium is smallest after a devaluation of the official exchange rate, while the premium gradually
increases until the next ofticial exchange rate devaluation.
It is well recognized that exchange rate management under a system of multiple exchange
rates, be they otlicial or unofticial, can he viewed as a tax policy. Huizinga (1991), for instance,
examines the black market for foreign exchange that arises from the evasion of exchange
regulations integral to a system of separate import and export exchange rates. At the same time,
Frenkel and Razin (1989) examine the equivalence between a system of dual exchange rates,
consisting of separate exchange rates tbr commercial and financial transactions, and tax policy.
The equivalence hetween exchange rate manegement with multiple exchange rates and tax
policy implies that exchange rate policy can be used instead of or in combination with direct fiscal
measures to effect the politically de.~ired relative guods prices facing consumers. A relatively tow
price price of importables, for instance, can be achieved by an export tax, an import tariff, or by
a relatively light consumption tax on importables. In these instances, income taxation or monetary
finance, as before, can t~e used to balance the government budget. In practice, countries use a
combination uf exchange rate and tax policie.e tu manipulate relative goods prices. Exchange rate
policy perhaps has the advantage ~rver tax pulicy that its redistributive implications are tat as
trattsparent.17
In practice, developing wuntries in particular appear to use a mix of exchange rate, trade and
tax policies to affext the relative prices of the various nontradeable and tradeable goods.t~
Krueger, Schiff and Valdés (1991) have compiled an exhaustive survey of the combined impact of
exchange rate, trade and tax policies on the wedge between internal and external prices of various
tradeable goods, particularly in the agricultural sector, for a large number of developing countries.
litese wedges, of course, have immediate implications for relative goods prices faced by
consumers. 1'he authurs explain the various explicit and implicit price interventions on the basis of
political economy rather than as consistent with some overall optimal tax structure. In eacó of the
country studies, the implications ut' thc overell scheme of price interventions for the distribution of
income are drawn out.
Egypt has used the full range of exchange rate, trade and tax policies to depress the relative
price of especially imported foods in the 1970s, as documented by Swbie (1983). In addition to
outright subsidies for imported focxls such as grains, butter, sugar and tea, Egypt rnaintained a
multiple exchange rate system with a relatively appreciated exchange rate for food imports. In
1981, the ofticial exchange rate for fixid imports, for instance, was L43 USSILE, while it was
1.19 USS~LE for non-focxi impurts. As a result of the various policies, the Egyptian market prices
of imported foods, such as wheat and rice, were abuut half of world prices in the 1979-1980
period.14 Consistent with the model, Egypt financed its food imports to a some extent with
specific exports such as oil and cuttun that by themselves do not represent a main part of the
consumption bundle. These expurts were taxed by the authorities. The authorities also used
ttwnetazy finance to tinance the tixx! impurts, resulting in an accelerating infiation in the late
1970s. In addition, the country incurred large foreign debts in maintaining its relatively apprecia-
ted exchange rate for fcwd imports.18
5. Conclusion
Developing cuuntries frequently suffer from recurring episodes of real exchange rate
overvaluation accompanied by munetary finance. Such episodes are puuling, because it cart
hardly be the case that developing cuuntry policy makers do ttot ktww how to reverse overvaluati-
ons, or that they believe that real exchange overvaluation generally improves economic efficiency
and welfare. This paper takes the view that apparent disequilibrium exchange rate policies are
pursued, because those in the middle of the political specttvm benefit from such policies at the
expense of others. Overvaluation in the present model implies that tradeables, and rnore specifical-
ly importahles, are inexpensive relative to nuntredeables. Such overvaluation benefits relatively
poor agents, as the evidence suggests that pour agents spend relatively little on nontradeables. In
the model, overvaluation henetits the median voter ifhe is poorer than the mean voter.
In an alternative interpretation of the model, there are two import goods and a single export
good. One of the import gcwds ~an be imtxirted et the fixed nominal exchange rate, while the
other import gaid and the expurt gixid are transacted at a more depreciated (black) market
ezchange rate. In this interpretation, the mudel explains the overvaluation of the officia! exchange
rate vis-à-vis the (black) market exchange rate. ln particular, the modet can explain cycles of
increasing (black) market exchange rate premia after each politically determined devaluation of the
official ezchange rate. It would be interesting to see to what extent empirical evidence can confirm
that the black market exchange rate premium rises over the political cycle.
This paper has assumed that thero is nu rationing of foreign exchange intended for purchases
of importables at the stated numinal impurt exchange rate. Many countries, of course, ration
foreign ezchange for impurt purpuses in a myriad of ways. Clearly, differential access to official
foreign exchange can explain differencrs in peoplés enthusiasm for various ezchange rate
policies. It would be interesting tu extend the present model to incorporate rationing of foreign
exchange availahle at the uvervalued ut'ticial exchange rate. The relatively wealthy and powerful
may stand a better chance of uhtaining rationed foreign exchange than the poor and unpowerful. If19
so, rationed foreign exchange is more likely to be used for the importation of luxury items than
for the importation of basic necessities. In some countries, a relatively appreciated import
exchange rate, therefore, may coexist with luxury imports. Empirical work perhaps can shed light
on the extent to which this is the case.20
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Proofofproposition 1:
As noted in the text, with g ~~ we have,
M M8
P" ~ L- G' Py s L- G
After totally differentiating (8) and noting the ahove expressions for P" and Py and also (4)
and (5), we find that with g a~,
dPx Y
dPy f - ÍV
After suhstituting for P~~ and P~, into (11), we tind after rearranging thet dV(B, i)IdPY G 0 is
eyuivalenttu,
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(Pv)2 dPY




Py ~ PY 8
After multiplying the above expressiun hy the respective denominators, we get after simplifying,
M(i) dJP~B) N.
p, ( B ~ Y ~ M d(i ye1 A. y(~. Ql
dP P l B J
If we take M(i) e M, then the ahuve is equivalent to,
d~IpBlnif pY I~ ~pl ~0
Nuting that 8- PYIPA., the ahuve is eyuivalent to,21
P ,
A dPy ( L N,
Finally noting (4) and (5), we get,
éP ~ 1-~
1Q a
Proof of propositions 3 urrd 4:
First frum (I1) we can check that with dV~dPy - 0 wz have,
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which is negative as,
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To establish the sign oFJ`VIdP,, d P, note that (I1) is eyuivalent to,
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Note that dRIJPv t 0 it' M(i) G M. Next, we can take the log of g, and differentiate with
respect to Q. The term ~y~)Ipv - p can be then substituted from (I1). 71te result after collecting
terms is,
d log(R) ~ 1 M
d p 0 ~ Pv
l l i
- QI - L~I . (1 -d) f I -
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Thus for M(i) c M and ~ 5 l, we immediately see that dRldp 1 p. Note that the sign of
this derivative is positive fur any value uf B, however, as we can always choose units of the
importable good so that ~ s I.




Next note that (8) and (l l) alluw us to derive the fullowing implicit expression for 9,
M M ~
g j P,, M(i)
a9 . (1 - a) B
l P
- YI
Using this expre.csiun and the aMwe derivatives, we ohtain,
dB ~ ~ dB ~ 0, de G 0
dL~ d~ dP
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Endnorrs
1. Little is gaine;cl if we assume that domestic agents also consume ezportables.
2. See the IMF (1993), pp. 590-96.
3. Specifically, we can tind from (3) that,
d(dM~Pn) ~- (! - a)(~ - B) G 0
d11~ aB . (1 - aJ~
and,
d(dMIPn) aB(6 - B)
dQ j aB f(1 - a)8
~ 0
4. For the real exchange rate to be cunstant, the nominal import exchange rate, P, will have
to be devalued continuously at a rate equal to the constant growth rate ofythe money
supply.
S. Qualitatively similar expenditure patterns are found by the authors for Nigerian data.
6. See Hazell and Roell (1983), Teble 12. Note that strictly speaking the utility specification
in (1) implies that marginal expenditure shares of households on nontradeables and on
importables are invariant with household income.
7. This restriction of the policy choice set results if the authorities lack the enforcement
technology tu furce importers to buy foreign exchange at an unfavorable depreciated
exchange rate from the authurities.
8. For a pnwf, see Huizinga (furthcuming).
9. This follows as dP~dM(t) ~ 0 with Mft) G M for a given valueofM ard withdV(B , i)~dPy ~ 0
in (11). ~
10. Alesina anJ Drazen (1991), instead, consider the pulitical aspect.e of a once-and-for-all
stahilizatiun ut' an unsustainahle ecunumic pulicy.
l l. See Mondino and Sturzenegger (1992), Figure 7. Inflation specifically fell after the
Cruudo plan of January 198fi, the Bresser plan of May 1987, the Summer plan of
December 1988, and the Collor plen of April 1990.
12. In the presence ut' expurt earnings surrender requirements, only part of the export earnings
may in fact gu tu the nun-crtticial exchange market. Similarly, part of the foreign exchange
for nun-approved imports may be ohtein~l at the official exchange rate through overinvoi-
cing of approved impcxts. These issues are not considered here.26
13. The redistrihutive implicatiuns uf exchange rate Ixilicy on account of income differences in
the case uf nun-humuthetic prcl'erences have receivecl little ariention. The redistributive im-
plications uf tex pulicies th~t affect relative guuds pricrs are, of wurse, central tu the
analysis of commudity taxatiun. See, for instance, Majumder (1988).
14. See Alderman, Vun Braun and Sakr (1982), Tahle 30.Diacuasion Paper Series. CeotER, Tilburg Uuivenity, The Netherlanda:
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